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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, and pursuant to a conditional plea
agreement, Scott Cameron Freeland entered an Alford plea1 to felony grand theft by
possession of stolen property. Mr. Freeland appealed, asserting the district court erred
when it denied his motion to suppress. Specifically, Mr. Freeland asserted at the time
the officers searched Mr. Freeland by having him empty his pockets, under the totality
of the circumstances a reasonable person would not have concluded that Mr. Freeland
posed a risk of danger. Thus, the search of Mr. Freeland’s person was unlawful and the
evidence obtained as a result of the search should have been suppressed.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued the district court’s order denying the
motion to suppress should be affirmed, because the officers had reasonable suspicion
Mr. Freeland was armed and dangerous when they frisked him (after they had him
empty his pockets), and Mr. Freeland’s argument on appeal is without factual or legal
merit. (See Resp. Br., pp.5-9.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to show the State’s arguments are unavailing
because they confuse the district court’s factual findings with the court’s legal
determinations, and address a straw man argument instead of Mr. Freeland’s assertions
on appeal. Further, the State has not specifically argued that at the time the officers
searched Mr. Freeland by having him empty his pockets, under the totality of the
circumstances a reasonable person would have concluded that Mr. Freeland posed a

1

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
1

risk of danger.

Thus, any future arguments by the State on that point should

be disregarded.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Freeland’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Freeland’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Freeland’s Motion To Suppress
Mr. Freeland asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress, because the search of his person was unlawful. The officers started the
search of Mr. Freeland’s person by having him empty his pockets. At the time the
officers had Mr. Freeland empty his pockets, under the totality of the circumstances a
reasonable person would not have concluded that Mr. Freeland posed a risk of danger.
Thus, the search of Mr. Freeland’s person was unlawful and the evidence obtained as a
result of the search should have been suppressed.

A.

The Officers Started The Search Of Mr. Freeland’s Person When They Had Him
Empty His Pockets
Mr. Freeland asserts that the officers started the search of his person when they

had him empty his pockets after Officer Solomon left the Maxwells’ house and spoke
with Officer Hutchison and Mr. Freeland. See, e.g., United States v. DiGiacomo, 579
F.2d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 1978); State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 627 (Ct. App. 2012).
The State’s arguments offered in response are unavailing, because they confuse
the district court’s factual findings with the court’s legal determinations.

The State

contends the facts of the case do not support Mr. Freeland’s argument because “[t]he
district court’s factual findings are that the frisk occurred only after officers saw the
holster, not when they asked to search [Mr.] Freeland’s pockets.” (Resp. Br., p.8.)
However, the district court’s factual findings on the events surrounding the
search (e.g., that the officers frisked Mr. Freeland), are different from the court’s legal
determinations on the reasonableness of the search (i.e., that the search of
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Mr. Freeland’s person was justified). This is shown by the separate standards of review
Idaho courts apply, in appeals from the denial of a motion to suppress, to factual
findings and legal determinations. See, e.g., State v. Allgood, 98 Idaho 525, 529 (1977)
(“[O]nce review is sought the appellate court has the ultimate responsibility of
measuring the facts as found by the trier against the constitutional standard of
reasonableness.”); State v. Heinen, 114 Idaho 656, 658 (Ct. App. 1988) (“The proper
standard of review is one of deference to factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. But, we may undertake a free review of the trial court’s determination as to
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of facts found.”);
State v. Burgess, 104 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1983) (“[T]his same approach should be
taken in analyzing the reasonableness of a frisk after the stop. Therefore, we must
decide the ultimate question of the reasonableness of the police actions in this case,
although we will take the facts as the district court found them.”)
The United States Supreme Court has similarly held, “[t]he principal components
of a determination of reasonable suspicion . . . will be the events which occurred leading
up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed
from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable
suspicion . . . .” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). The Ornelas Court
noted, “[t]he first part of the analysis involves only a determination of historical facts, but
the second is a mixed question of law and fact.” Id. The Ornelas Court held, “[a]s a
general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion . . . should be reviewed de novo
on appeal. . . . [A] reviewing court should take care . . . to review findings of historical
fact only for clear error . . . .”

5

While the State acknowledges the bifurcated standard of review (see Resp.
Br., p.6), its arguments confuse the district court’s findings of fact with the court’s legal
determinations. By determining the frisk was justified, the district court made a legal
determination that the search of Mr. Freeland’s person was reasonable.

(See

R., pp.168-69.) However, as discussed in the Appellant’s Brief (App. Br., p.12), the
district court did not address whether the search of Mr. Freeland’s person instead
started when the officers had him empty his pockets. (See R., pp.168-69.) Like he has
asserted on appeal, Mr. Freeland asserted before the district court the search of his
person started when the officers had him empty his pockets, and the search at that time
was not justified. (See Tr., p.183, L.19 – p.184, L.9.)
The district court’s finding, as a historical fact, that the officers frisked
Mr. Freeland (R., p.165), does not mean the district court’s legal determination that the
search of Mr. Freeland’s person was reasonable is subject to clear error review. In the
words of the Idaho Supreme Court, this Court now has “the ultimate responsibility of
measuring the facts as found by the trier against the constitutional standard of
reasonableness.”

See Allgood, 98 Idaho at 529.

Despite the State’s argument

confusing the district court’s factual findings with the court’s legal determinations, this
Court “must decide the ultimate question of the reasonableness of the police actions in
this case.” See Burgess, 104 Idaho at 561. Thus, Mr. Freeland may challenge the
district court’s legal determination that the search of his person was reasonable, by
asserting the search started when the officers had him empty his pockets and the
search at that time was not justified. The State’s arguments confuse the district court’s
factual findings with the court’s legal determinations, and are therefore unavailing.
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The State’s arguments are also unavailing because they address a straw man
argument instead of Mr. Freeland’s assertions on appeal. Mr. Freeland does not assert
on appeal that “asking for consent to search is itself a search.” (See Resp. Br., pp.8-9.)
Rather, as discussed in the Appellant’s Brief (App. Br., pp.12-14), Mr. Freeland asserts
on appeal the officers started the search of his person when they had him empty
his pockets.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained that additional intrusions outside a
pat-down search or frisk may come under the scope of Terry. See State v. Tyler, 153
Idaho 623, 627 (Ct. App. 2012).

Further, as seen in the Appellant’s Brief (App.

Br., p.13), courts in some other jurisdictions have held officers having an individual
empty his or her pockets constitutes a limited search covered by Terry. See, e.g.,
United States v. DiGiacomo, 579 F.2d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 1978).
Thus, unlike the straw man argument the State insists on addressing (see Resp.
Br., p.9), Mr. Freeland’s assertion, that the officers started the search of his person
when they had him empty his pockets, is supported by authority.

The State’s

arguments are unavailing because they address a straw man argument instead of
Mr. Freeland’s assertions on appeal. The search of Mr. Freeland’s person started when
the officers had him empty his pockets.

B.

At The Time The Officers Had Mr. Freeland Empty His Pockets, Under The
Totality Of The Circumstances A Reasonable Person Would Not Have
Concluded That Mr. Freeland Posed A Risk Of Danger
Mr. Freeland asserts that, at the time the officers had him empty his pockets,

under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would not have concluded
that Mr. Freeland posed a risk of danger. See State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-11
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(2009); State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660-61 (2007).

Thus, the search of

Mr. Freeland’s person was unlawful.
While the State contends the frisk was justified (Resp. Br., pp.7-8), the State has
not specifically argued that, at the time the officers had Mr. Freeland empty his pockets
(before the frisk), under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would
have concluded that Mr. Freeland posed a risk of danger. (See Resp. Br., pp.5-9.)
Thus, any future argument by the State on the search being justified at the time the
officers had Mr. Freeland empty his pockets, should be disregarded by this Court. Cf.
State v. Almarez, 154 Idaho 584, 598-99 (2013) (holding the State failed to meet its
burden of proving an error harmless, where the State never specifilly argued the error
did not contribute to the verdict obtained).
Because the officers’ search of Mr. Freeland’s person by having him empty his
pockets was unlawful, the evidence obtained as a result of the search should have been
suppressed. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 821; Henage, 143 Idaho at 662-63. The district
court’s denial of the motion to suppress should be reversed, the judgment of conviction
and order of commitment should be vacated, and the case should be remanded to the
district court for further proceedings. See Henage, 143 Idaho at 662-63.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Freeland respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court‘s order
denying his motion to suppress, vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction and
order of commitment, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 20th day of March, 2017.

___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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